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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SPEAKING WITH YOUR MOUTH
SHUT? EXPLORING THE OUTER LIMITS OF FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF
MILITARY RECRUITING ON LAW SCHOOL CAMPUSES
Rumsfeld v. Forumfor Academic and InstitutionalRights, Inc.,

126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006)
Emily S. Wilbanks* ""
In response to the increasing refusal of law schools and other
institutions of higher education to allow the U.S. military to engage in oncampus recruiting, Congress passed the Solomon Amendment.' The
Solomon Amendment mandates a denial of federal funds to any school
that refuses to allow the military to recruit on campus.2 Many law schools
* J.D. anticipated 2008, University ofFlorida Levin College of Law; B.A. 2003, University
of Florida. This Comment is dedicated to my parents, Bonnie and Billy Wilbanks, and to Matthew
Sherlock. Your love and support has allowed me to chase my dreams, and your constant
encouragement has reminded me to set my expectations high. I will always be grateful that you are
all a part of my life.
** This Comment won the George W. Milam Award for best Comment in Fall 2006.
1. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld (FAIR 1), 291 F. Supp.
2d 269, 278 (D.N.J. 2003), rev'd, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006).
Congress framed the law as an attempt to facilitate recruitment of qualified candidates and to curb
the distribution of tax dollars to institutions that interfered with the government's duty to raise a
military. Id. at 279 n.2. The discontent of some Congressmen over the hindrance of military
recruiting on American campuses was obvious. See id. For example, co-sponsor of the law Rep.
Richard Pombo opined that the institutions "need to know that their starry-eyed idealism comes
with a price" and that the Solomon Amendment should be supported by Congress in order to "send
a message over the wall of the ivory tower of higher education." Id. (citation omitted).
Undoubtedly, law schools became more pressured by the demands for equal treatment of military
recruiters following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which created an increased need
for more recruits. Stephen Henderson, Case Pits Military Against Colleges; Supreme Court to
Decide if Schools Can Ban Recruiters, Yet Keep Funding,Hous. CHRON., May 3, 2005, at A5.
2. 10 U.S.C.A. § 983 (West 2007). The Solomon Amendment reads in relevant part:
(b) Denial of funds for preventing military recruiting on campus. -No funds
described in subsection (d)(1) may be provided by contract or by grant to an
institution ofhigher education (including any subelement ofsuch institution) if the
Secretary of Defense determines that that institution (or any subelement of that
institution) has a policy or practice (regardless of when implemented) that either
prohibits, or in effect prevents(1) the Secretary of a military department or Secretary of Homeland Security
from gaining access to campuses, or access to students (who are 17 years of age
or older) on campuses, for purposes of military recruiting in a manner that is at
least equal in quality and scope to the access to campuses and to students that is
provided to any other employer; or
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sought to exclude military recruiters on the basis that the military's policy
regarding homosexuality' was a violation of the schools'
antidiscrimination policies.' The Forum for Academic and Institutional
Rights (FAIR),5 Respondent, alleged that the Solomon Amendment
infringed upon the schools' First Amendment freedoms of speech and
association. 6 FAIR filed suit in the United States District Court for the

(2) 'access by military recruiters for purposes of military recruiting to the
following information pertaining to students (who are 17 years of age or older)
enrolled at that institution (or any subelement of that institution):
(A) Names, addresses, and telephone listings.
(B) Date and place of birth, levels of education, academic majors, degrees
received, and the most recent educational institution enrolled in by the student.
Id.
3. The pertinent part of the military's policy on homosexuality is codified as follows:
(b) Policy. -A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the armed
forces under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense if one or more of
the following findings is made and approved in accordance with procedures set
forth in such regulations:
(1) That the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited
another to engage in a homosexual act or acts unless there are further findings,
made and approved in accordance with procedures set forth in such regulations,
that the member has demonstrated that(A) such conduct is a departure from the member's usual and customary
behavior;
(B) such conduct, under all the circumstances, is unlikely to recur;
(C) such conduct was not accomplished byuse offorce, coercion, or intimidation;
(D) under the particular circumstances of the case, the member's continued
presence in the armed forces is consistent with the interests of the armed forces
in proper discipline, good order, and morale; and
(E) the member does not have a propensity or intent to engage in
homosexual acts.
(2) That the member has stated that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual, or
words to that effect, unless there is a further finding, made and approved in
accordance with procedures set forth in the regulations, that the member has
demonstrated that he or she is not a person who engages in, attempts to engage in,
has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts.
(3) That the member has married or attempted to marry a person known to be
of the same biological sex.
10 U.S.C.A. § 654.
4. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR II1), 126 S. Ct.
1297, 1302 (2006).
5. FAIR is an association of law schools and faculty members whose mission is "to promote
academic freedom, support educational institutions in opposing discrimination and vindicate the
rights of institutions of higher education." Id.
6. Id. at 1303. The Solomon Amendment allegedly forced the schools to choose between
losing federal funding or disseminating a message with which they strongly disagreed. Id. The
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District of New Jersey challenging the constitutionality of the Solomon
Amendment.7 The district court held that the Solomon Amendment was
constitutional because it neither compelled speech nor significantly
affected the schools' ability to express their own messages.' On appeal, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and found that the Solomon
Amendment was unconstitutional because it violated the schools' rights of
association and impermissibly compelled them to participate in the
expressive act of recruiting.9 The United States Supreme Court
unanimously reversed and HELD that the Solomon Amendment was not
a violation of the law schools' First Amendment freedoms of speech or
association and thus was a constitutionally permissible act of the
legislature."°
The United States Supreme Court had previously found compelled
speech to be a violation of the First Amendment." In West VirginiaBoard
of Education v. Barnette,2 the Court reviewed a state law that required
school children to recite the Pledge of Allegiance (Pledge) and to salute
the flag daily. 3 Plaintiffs, a group of Jehovah's Witnesses, challenged the
constitutionality of the law.' 4 The Court held that requiring children to
recite the Pledge or salute the flag violated the children's freedom of
speech.'5
federal funding at issue was a significant figure, approximately $35 billion annually provided by
the government to American colleges and universities. Sarah Schweitzer, High Court Hears
Campus Recruiting Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 7, 2005, at A2. The Solomon Amendment
mandated that even if only the law school denied access to the military recruiters, federal funding
would be withheld from the entire university. Id.
7. See Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld (FAIR 1), 291 F. Supp.
2d 269 (D.N.J. 2003), rev'd, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006).
8. Id. at 309-10.
9. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld (FAIR II), 390 F.3d 219,
230 (3d Cir. 2004), rev 'd, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006). The appellate court was convinced by FAIR's
analogy to Boy Scouts ofAm. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), on the association issue. Fair I, 390
F.3d at 232. The court determined that just as Dale's presence in the Boy Scouts would force the
Scouts to send the message that it accepted homosexuality, the presence of military recruiters on
campus would force the law schools to send the message that the schools accepted discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation. Id. The appellate court also found that recruiting was an
expressive activity because it entailed oral and written communication and had the purpose of
convincing students that working for a specific employer is worthwhile. Id. at 236-37. Furthermore,
the court determined that the Solomon Amendment compelled speech by forcing schools to
disseminate the military's message by distributing newsletters, scheduling receptions and
interviews, sending e-mails, and posting flyers to notify students of the military's recruiting
activities. Id. at 240.
10. FAIR III, 126 S. Ct. at 1313.
11. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
12. 319 U.S.624 (1943).
13. Id. at626.
14. Id. at 629-30.
15. Id. at 642.
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In rendering its decision, the Barnette Court emphasized the
inappropriateness of compelling the students to verbally declare a belief 6
and of requiring them to engage in the expressive, albeit silent, act of
saluting the flag. 7 It opined that to uphold the state law requiring all
students to salute the flag would be tantamount to saying that the "Bill of
Rights[,] which guards the individual's right to speak his own mind, left
it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his
mind."' 8 In Barnette, the Court expressly overruled a prior case permitting
similarly compelled speech 9 and took on a decidedly more protective role
in its application of the First Amendment.2" The Court firmly espoused its
commitment to preventing speakers from being told what to say, either
verbally or symbolically.2'
More than fifty years later, a unanimous Court continued in its
protective role by proscribing the application of a state law that would
have forced a group of parade organizers to alter their desired message.22
In Hurley v. Irish-AmericanGay,Lesbian andBisexual Group ofBoston,23
parade organizers refused to allow a particular group of openly
16. Id.at 631.
17. Id. at 632. The Court noted that "the flag salute is a form of utterance" and that
"[s]ymbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas." Id.Therefore, the Court
found that the symbolic act of the salute was itself a form of speech and, even absent the Pledge,
was a required affirmation of a state of mind or belief. Id.at 633. The dissent, on the other hand,
argued that the salute in no way expressed or suppressed a particular belief. Id. at 664 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter explained that requiring a child to stand and salute the flag in no
way restricted a full opportunity for the child or his parents to publicly express their disapproval
of the meaning of the gesture. Id.
18. Id.at 634 (majority opinion).
19. Id.at 642. The Court expressly overruled MinersvilleSchool Districtv. Gobitis,310 U.S.
586 (1940). Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. In Gobitis, the Court held that it was constitutional for the
school board to expel students who refused to participate in the Pledge and salute the flag. See
Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 599-600.
20. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. The Gobitis Court determined that allowing special
treatment for a minority of students that wished not to comply undermined the legislature's
judgment that such allowances would weaken the effect of the whole exercise. Gobitis, 310 U.S.
at 599-600. The Barnette Court, on the other hand, emphasized the importance of protecting an
individual's right to freely express his or her views regardless of whether such views are in
conformity with the majority. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641. The Barnette majority sternly cautioned
against compelling those with differing viewpoints to express mainstream beliefs, explaining that
"[t]hose who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters.
Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard." Id.In taking on
a more protective role, the majority in Barnette called freedom to express one's own ideas or
opinions a "fixed star in our constitutional constellation" and made it clear that exceptions to
unbridled free speech would indeed be rare. Id. at 642.
21. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
22. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 566
(1995).
23. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
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homosexual individuals to participate in a St. Patrick's Day parade. 24 The
group sued, claiming violation of a state public accommodations law
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation.2" Parade organizers
countered that the application of the state law was unconstitutional because
it infringed on their First Amendment freedoms of speech and expressive
association.26 The state trial court and the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, on appeal, both held that the application of the statute did
not unconstitutionally impair the parade organizers' First Amendment
rights because the parade had no discemable expressive purpose. 27 The
United States Supreme Court disagreed and reversed.2"
In finding that the parade organizers were entitled to First Amendment
protection, the Court determined that parades are inherently expressive.29
Once it established the expressive nature of the parade, the Court reasoned
that each participant in the parade affected the parade's overall message.3"
Thus, use of the state law to force inclusion of a group with a contrary
message would require the parade organizers to alter their own message.3 '
Continuing the protective trend begun in Barnette, the Court held that such
a result was a violation of the First Amendment rule that
"a speaker has the
32
autonomy to choose the content of his own message.

24. Id. at 561.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 563. The parade organizers claimed that the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB) was excluded because the organizers determined that the
message expressed by GLIB regarding homosexuality was contradictory to the parade's general
message supporting traditional social and religious values. Id.at 562.
27. Id.at 563-64.
28. Id.at 566.
29. Id.at 568. The Court noted that a "parade" is more than a group of people moving from
one place to another. Id.In a parade, marchers make a "collective point, not just to each other but
to bystanders along the way." Id.Therefore, the Court reasoned, parades are "a form of expression,
not just motion." Id.It further noted that a narrowly articulated message is not necessary to trigger
First Amendment protection. Id.at 569. The Court stated, "a private speaker does not forfeit
constitutional protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes
to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the speech." Id.at 569-70.
30. Id.at 572.
31. Id, at 572-73.
32. Id.at 573. In its determination that the parade's message was impermissibly altered, the
Hurley Court distinguished Turner BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. FCC,512 U.S. 622 (1994), in
which the Court rejected the cable company's claim that regulations requiring cable operators to
reserve certain channels for designated broadcast signals violated its First Amendment right to
choose its own message. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576. As discussed by the Court, the key distinction
between Hurley and Turner Broadcastingwas the practicability of disclaimer. Id The cable
companies in TurnerBroadcastingcommonly disclaimed any relationship between their viewpoints
and those expressed by those using the broadcast facility, and therefore there was no danger of
viewers mistaking broadcasted messages as those of the host cable company. Id In Hurley,
however, the parade organizers could not easily disclaim GLIB's message as contrary to their own.
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Five years after the Hurley decision, the Court again applied the First
Amendment to prevent an organization's message from being
compromised by the forced inclusion of an unwanted member.33 In Boy
Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale,34 an assistant scoutmaster's adult membership
was revoked when the Boy Scouts became aware that he was a
homosexual. 35 Dale sued, alleging violation of a state public
accommodations statute.36 The Boy Scouts, much like the parade
organizers in Hurley, contended that application of the state statute would
infringe upon its First Amendment rights by altering its message. 37 The
New Jersey Supreme Court held that the law was constitutional and that
Hurley was inapplicable because Dale's reinstatement as a scoutmaster
would not require the Boy Scouts to express any particular message.38 In
a five-four decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed and held
that the application of the statute was an unconstitutional violation of the
First Amendment.39
In Dale, the Court focused on the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right
of expressive association.40 Notably, the Court stated that "forced inclusion
of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group's freedom of
expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a significant
way the group's ability to advocate public or private viewpoints. '
Deferring to the Boy Scouts' view of its own message,42 the Court found
that Dale's presence would force the organization to send a message that

Id. The Hurley Court opined that "such disclaimers would be quite curious in a moving parade."
Id.at 576-77.
33. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
34. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
35. Id.at 644-45. The Boy Scouts learned of Dale's sexual orientation when a newspaper
printed an interview with Dale concerning his advocacy of the need for role models for gay and
lesbian teenagers. See id.at 645.
36. Id.
37. Id.at 645-46. The Boy Scouts declared that its mission is to "instill values in young
people." Id.at 649. It further asserted that homosexuality is not "morally straight" or "clean" within
the meaning of those terms in the Scout Oath and Law, which defines the values the organization
seeks to instill in its members. Id.at 649-50.
38. Id.at 647.
39. Id. at 644.
40. Id.
41. Id.at 648 (citing N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988)).
42. Id.at 653. The majority stated that the Court must give deference both to an
organization's "assertions regarding the nature of its expression" and to its "view of what would
impair its expression." Id.Interestingly, the dissent found the approach quite novel and denounced
giving such deference. Id. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated, "This is an
astounding view of the law. I am unaware of any previous instance in which our analysis of the
scope of a constitutional right was determined by looking at what a litigant asserts in his or her brief
and inquiring no further." Id.
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it accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.4"
Analogizing Dale to Hurley, the Court determined that in both cases the
inclusion of the unwanted member interfered with the speaker's choice
"not to propound a point of view contrary to its beliefs."
Moreover, Dale seemingly expanded the decision in Hurley. 5 In Dale,
the Boy Scouts did not contend that Dale used or intended to use his
position as assistant scoutmaster to advocate homosexuality or to send a
particular message.' The Court extended the reach of First Amendment
protection to prevent the government from requiring inclusion of a group
member whose mere presence would alter the speaker's message,
regardless of any intended message by the excluded member.47 The trend
toward expansive protection continued.
The instant case, however, attempted to corral the broadening scope of
freedoms of speech, expression, and association by refusing to extend First
Amendment protection to Respondents. Following a trend of expansive
First Amendment protection, Respondents argued the similarities between
their situation and those of prior free speech cases.48 The instant Court
obligingly analyzed the facts in light of Barnette,Hurley, and Dale49 and
concluded that the law schools were neither limited in what they may say
nor required to say anything under the Solomon Amendment."
Distinguishing the precedent cases from the instant case, the Court drew
a line indicating how far it would expand First Amendment protection and
then refused to cross it.5 '

43. Id.at 653 (majority opinion).
44. Id.at 654.
45. In Hurley, the Court noted that GLIB's act of marching as an individual unit was itself
expressive conduct that was intended to convey a particular message, and GLIB was permissibly
excluded on those grounds. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515
U.S. 557, 570 (1995). GLIB was formed for the purpose of marching in the parade and its goal was
to convey the message that its members are openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals in the
Irish-American community in Boston, and that they deserve support. Id.The parade organizers in
Hurley did not purport to exclude homosexuals from participating in the parade generally, but
excluded GLIB because they disagreed with the particular message expressed by the group as a
distinct parade unit. Id.at 572.
46. Dale, 530 U.S. at 689 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47. See id. at 648 (majority opinion).
48. See Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 18-19, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic
and Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006) (FAIR III) (No. 04-1152), 2005 WL 754128,
at * 18-19 (pointing out factual similarities among the instant case, Hurley, and Dale: In each case
an organization excluded a group or individual because inclusion of that person or group would
alter the intended message of the organization).
49. FAIR III, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1313 (2006).
50. Id.at 1307.
51. See id.
at 1313.
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First, the Court distinguished Barnette from the instant case, finding
52
that the Solomon Amendment did not tell Respondents what to say.
Although the schools might be required to send recruiting information on
the military's behalf, and that communication would likely include
elements of speech,5 3 the Court reasoned that such recruiting assistance
would be "a far cry from the compelled speech in Barnette."54 Not only
would the content of any recruiting-related speech be unaffected by the
Solomon Amendment," but the dissemination of such speech would be
required only if the school chose to provide similar speech on behalf of
other recruiters. 6 Moreover, the Court opined that equivocating the instant
case to the compelled speech in Barnette "trivializes" the First
Amendment freedom protected therein."
Second, the instant Court distinguished Hurleyby determining that the
law schools' messages in the instant case were not affected by the
inclusion of the military recruiters.5 The Court found that providing
recruiting services, unlike a parade, is not inherently expressive.5 9 The
Court reasoned that no one would have reason to believe that the schools
agreed with ideas expressed by the recruiters allowed on campus,60 and it
noted that the schools were welcome to say whatever they pleased
regarding the military's policies without repercussion under the Solomon
Amendment. 6 ' Furthermore, the Court found it extremely relevant that the
conduct of excluding military recruiters expressed the school's intended

52. Id.at 1308.
53. Id.(recognizing that e-mails and notices are speech subject to First Amendment scrutiny);
see also FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219, 230-32 (3d Cir. 2004) (discussing modes of communication that
schools may be required to undertake in connection with recruiting), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006).
54. FAIR 11, 126 S. Ct. at 1308.
55. Id.
56. Id, at 1305 (discussing the instant Court's interpretation of the Solomon Amendment as
a requirement that law schools offer the same recruiting assistance to the military that they provide
to other recruiters). Perhaps more importantly, the instant Court noted that in Barnette students
were not given a choice to remain silent because the government directly mandated their
participation. See id.at 1308. In the instant case, however, the schools could avoid participating in
recruiting assistance for the military if they chose not to offer it to other employers. See id.
57. Id.
58. Id.at 1309-10.
59. Id.; cf.Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
568-70 (1995) (noting that parades are inherently expressive).
60. FAIR III, 126 S.Ct. at 1310. In its reasoning, the instant Court cited a prior First
Amendment case, BoardofEducation of Westside Community School v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226
(1990), which held that high school students were capable of appreciating the difference between
speech sponsored by their school and speech that their school was legally required to allow because
of an equal access policy. Id.(citing Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250). The instant Court then noted its
doubt that students lose the ability to tell the difference by the time they reach law school. Id.
61. Id.at 1310.
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message only when accompanied by an explanation.62 Their conduct
lacking inherent expression,63 Respondents were not, in the instant Court's
opinion, analogous to the parade organizers in Hurley.'
Finally, the instant Court distinguished Dale, finding that extending
temporary access to a person or group is quite different from forcing an
organization to permanently admit an unwanted group member. 65 The
instant Court recognized that law schools "associate" with military
recruiters to the extent that they must interact with them during the visit to
campus, but it noted that the military recruiter never becomes part of the
law school.66 Accordingly, the instant Court held that the presence of a
military recruiter on campus did not violate Respondents' right to
associate, no matter how repugnant the school finds the recruiter's
message.61
By distinguishing prior cases that triggered First Amendment
protection, the instant Court truncated the trend expanding its protective
role.68 Coming only six years after the Dale decision, it might not have
been unthinkable that the instant Court would afford protection to
Respondents.69 Clearly it seemed feasible to at least several constitutional
law scholars.7" However, the instant Court refused to "stretch ...First

62. Id.at 1311.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 1309.
65. Id. at 1312.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1313.
68. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment and Military Recruiting, TRIAL, May
2006, at 78, 79 (calling the FAIR III decision a departure from precedent and a narrowing of First
Amendment protections); cf Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (protecting
organization from required inclusion of a member whose presence would alter its message); Hurley
v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (protecting parade
organizers from being forced to include a parade unit with an objectionable message); Riley v.
Nat'l Fed'n ofthe Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (holding North Carolina Charitable Solicitations
Act unconstitutional because it impermissibly mandated speech the speaker would not ordinarily
make); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (protecting utility
company from being required to include objectionable newsletter in bill sent to customer); Wooley
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (protecting motorists from being forced to display objectionable
state motto on license plate); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (protecting
newspaper editors' right to choose content of their own newspaper); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (extending protection to prevent students from being forced to recite
the Pledge against their beliefs).
69. See First Amendment Center, High CourtHearsCase ofMilitaryRecruiterson Campus,
Dec. 6, 2005, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=16158 (indicating that free
speech cases often generate divided Supreme Court decisions and predicting a tie-breaker vote in
the instant case).
70. Professors at some of the nation's prominent law schools participated in the suit either
as plaintiffs or by submitting briefs in support of FAIR's position. FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269,
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Amendment doctrines well beyond the sort of activities these doctrines
protect.'
Importantly, the Court briefly discussed alternative grounds for its
decision in the instant case,7 2 yet chose to elaborate on the First
Amendment issue. 73 The Court noted that the Solomon Amendment would
be permissible even if it restricted Respondents' speech because it
promoted a "substantial Government interest in raising and supporting the
Armed Forces" and that interest could not be achieved as effectively
absent the statute. 74 Acknowledging that the constitutionality of the
Solomon Amendment could be sustained without exploring its actual
effect on freedom of speech,75 the instant Court made a purposeful
statement about the reach of the First Amendment by deciding the case on
those grounds.76
The Court clarified that the First Amendment protects conduct only if
it is inherently expressive 77 and went on to state that activity requiring

275-76 (D.N.J. 2003). For example, two of the named plaintiffs in the instant case were well known
constitutional law professors: Erwin Chemerinsky of Duke University School of Law, and Sylvia
Law of New York University Law School. See id.
71. FAIR III, 126 S. Ct.at 1313.
72. See id.at 1306-07 (recognizing Congress's constitutional power to raise and support a
military).
73. Id.at 1307-13; see also Linda Greenhouse, U.S. Wins Ruling over Recruiting at
Universities, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2006, at Al (identifying the lack of infringement on
Respondents' freedom of speech as the "heart of the court's analysis," but recognizing the
significance of the Court's discussion of Congress's constitutional power to raise an army).
74. FAIR III, 126 S.Ct. at 1311; see also Major Anita J. Fitch, The Solomon Amendment: A
War on Campus,ARMY LAW., May 2006, at 12, 19 (noting the important role played by judge
advocates in the armed forces and the chilling effect on recruiting ofjudge advocates that would
have been likely had the Court held the Solomon Amendment unconstitutional).
75. FAIR II1,
126 S.Ct. at 1311.
76. See id.at 1313. It is noteworthy that the opinion was unanimous. The New York Times
called the decision a "Supreme Court Smackdown" and noted that the opinion packed a particularly
devastating punch for Respondents because the law professors challenging the Solomon
Amendment failed to "produce so much as a sympathetic word from liberal justices like Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, David H. Souter and John Paul Stevens." Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Smackdown!,
N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 12, 2006, § 4,at 5. It seems that delivery of such a forceful opinion by way of
a unanimous decision indicates the instant Court's desire to make a point about the state of First
Amendment jurisprudence. A bewildered attorney for Respondents found it difficult to believe that
"three dozen law schools, 900 law professors, the court of appeals, and a dozen top law firms are
all inept at connecting the dots of Supreme Court precedents." Id. Obviously, however, the Court
wanted to make it clear that the First Amendment does not reach the situation addressed in the
instant case, and the Court never intended its First Amendment precedent to lead to the conclusion
that Respondents suggested. See id.
77. FAIR III, 126 S. Ct. at 1310; cf Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,399,406 (1989) (finding
that flag burning was sufficiently communicative of a particularized message to be expressive
conduct entitled to First Amendment protection); Spencev. Washington,418 U.S. 405,409 (1974)
(declaring the necessity of determining whether "activity was sufficiently imbued with elements
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explanatory speech to convey a message is not inherently expressive.78 The
effect is that activity will not be deemed expressive just because the
speaker says it is. 79 This is certainly a logical limit. The instant Court noted
that any other conclusion would absurdly allow a regulated speaker to
transform any conduct into protected speech simply by talking about it.80
This express limit on First Amendment protection conforms to precedent8"
and maintains the integrity of the Constitution.82
Furthermore, the Court implied that the practicability of disclaimer
could remove certain compelled speech or expressive conduct from First4
Amendment protection. 3 Such a notion follows logically from past cases,8

of communication to fall within the scope of the First . . . Amendment[]"); United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (reserving First Amendment protection for expressive conduct
and refusing to "accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled
'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea");
Greenhouse, supranote 73 (identifying the importance of Court's finding in FAIR llthat allowing
recruiters on campus was not "inherently expressive").
78. See FAIR III, 126 S.Ct. at 1311. While a parade is inherently expressive, regardless of
whether a delineated message has been announced, Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 568-70 (1995), a ban of recruiting activities is not. FAIR
III, 126 S.Ct. at 1311. Despite Respondents' assertion that the motive for exclusion of military
recruiters from campus was solely to express a message that the schools disagreed with the
military's policies, their conduct was not expressive. Id. at 1310-11.
79. This rule raises questions about the validity of the majority's contested assertion in Dale
that a speaker should be given deference in defining the meaning of his or her message. See supra
note 42 and accompanying text. If the Court refuses to allow a speaker to declare that certain
conduct is expressive if it is not inherently so, then why should it allow a speaker to declare what
its message is if that message is not apparent? The Court was not required to address this issue in
the instant case because it determined that banning recruiting is not expressive conduct, and
therefore Respondents sent no message at all. FAIR III, 126 S.Ct. at 1309.
80. FAIR III, 126 S.Ct. at 1311. The Court gave an illustrative example where, under
Respondents' definition of expressive conduct, an individual who announces that he intends to
express disapproval of the IRS by refusing to pay taxes could trigger First Amendment analysis of
the Tax Code simply because he verbally claims that his conduct of not paying taxes is expressive.
Id.
81. See, e.g., Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568 (finding that parades are inherently expressive and
therefore subject to First Amendment scrutiny); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399, 406 (finding that flag
burning was sufficiently communicative of a particularized message to be expressive conduct
entitled to First Amendment protection); Spence, 418 U.S. at 409; O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
82. See FAIR III, 126 S. Ct. at 1308 (discussing trivialization of First Amendment precedent
by extending protection in the instant case); Linda Greenhouse, Justices Weigh Military'sAccess
to Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2005, at Al (reporting that Justice Breyer expressed concern
in oral arguments that a victory for Respondents could provide a constitutional basis for the
challenge of other antidiscrimination laws by speakers who wanted to circumvent compliance with
federal law); supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing potential abuses of extending
protection in this case).
83. See FAIR 11, 126 S.Ct. at 1310 (finding that extending recruiting access in no way
indicates that the school agrees with the recruiters' message, especially since the school is free to
say what they like about military policy). In the instant case, Respondents claimed that disclaimers

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2022

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 4

448

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

although it raises two possible issues. First, speech (or expressive conduct)
might be more difficult to protect from unwilling accommodation of a
contrary message if the speaker, via disclaimer, can easily thwart dilution
of its intended message.8 5 However, this issue is not as troubling as it
might seem. The First Amendment is best served by countering a contrary
expression with more speech rather than less.86 Moreover, availability of
disclaimer is not conclusive, but
only a factor weighing in favor of finding
87
danger of attribution unlikely.

were insufficient to make clear to students and the public that the school opposed the military's
policy on homosexuality. Schweitzer, supranote 6, at A2. Respondents argued that students simply
would not believe the disclaimers; but Chief Justice Roberts focused on the feasibility of
disclaimers and pointed out that if the schools found disclaimers insufficient, they were free to
decline federal funding and turn away the military recruiters in order to make their opposition clear.
Id.
84. See supranote 32 and accompanying text (finding First Amendment infringement where
the speaker could not employ a disclaimer to distinguish its viewpoint from that of a parade
participant and distinguishing prior case where disclaimer was available).
85. See FAIR III, 126 S. Ct. at 1310 (discussing relevance of students' ability to recognize
disclaimer and distinguish schools' opinions from that of recruiter); Greenhouse, supranote 82, at
Al (noting that Justice O'Connor found it important that the schools could easily inform the
students that the school disagreed with the military's policy). But see FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219, 241
(3d Cir. 2004), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006) (claiming that "the Supreme Court has never held that
compelled speech concerns evaporate if a speaker can ameliorate the risk of misattribution by
disclaiming the message it is being compelled to propagate."); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils.
Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 15 n. 11 (1986) ("The presence of a disclaimer... does not suffice to
eliminate the impermissible pressure ... to respond to [compelled] speech.") (plurality opinion);
Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 99 (1980) ("The mere fact that he is free to
dissociate himself from the views expressed on his property [through use of disclaimers] cannot
restore his 'right to refrain from speaking at all."' (citations omitted)); Chemerinsky, supra note
68, at 79 (describing the Court's decision in FAIR III as a departure from precedent because the
Court had never before found that compelled speech was acceptable if the speaker could later
disavow the compelled message).
86. See Greenhouse, supra note 82, at Al (reiterating a comment by Justice Breyer opining
that the normal First Amendment "remedy for speech you don't like is not less speech, it is more
speech").
87. First Amendment protection was rarely available if there was little danger of the contrary
message being attributed to the speaker claiming infringement. See supra note 60 and
accompanying text (explaining that there was little danger in the instant case of recruiters' message
being attributed to school and thus no infringement); see also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors
of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 841-42 (1995) (finding no infringement where fear of attribution of
message was not plausible); Pruneyard,447 U.S. at 87 (refusing First Amendment protection where
there was little likelihood that the message of demonstrators would be identified with owner of
shopping center where demonstrations took place). It is likely that a disclaimer only adds to the
evidence that the danger of attribution is minimal, and therefore the instant Court's focus on
disclaimer really does little to change the state of the law. See, e.g., Pruneyard,447 U.S. at 87
(considering store owner's ability to post signs to disclaim any sponsorship of the handbillers'
message as a factor indicating minimal danger of attribution).
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Second, certain future disclaimers might violate the Solomon
Amendment. 8 The Court encouraged law schools to express their
disapproval of the military's failure to comply with their
antidiscrimination policy by other means.8 9 The Court, however, neglected
to define fully how protests would square with the Solomon Amendment9"
as interpreted by the Court.9 Surely protesting outside of a military
recruiter's interview room on campus could run afoul of the Solomon
Amendment's mandate to provide the military the same access that is
provided to any other employer.92 It is unlikely that other favored
employers would receive a similarly cold welcome to campus. The Court
left the legal analysis of limits on disclaimers to be resolved another day,
and further litigation seems likely, as plans to push the limits are well
under way.93

88. The instant Court raised this question during oral argument and probed Petitioners about
what exactly the schools could do to disclaim their objection to the military's policy, but no
discussion of how far the schools could go appeared in the Court's opinion. See Transcript of Oral
Argument at 25, FAIR III, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006) (No. 04-1152), 2005 WL 3387694, at *25.
89. FAIR 11, 126 S. Ct. at 1310, 1313.
90. During oral arguments, Justice O'Connor asked the attorney for the government, Solicitor
General Paul Clement, whether the schools would be able to post notices or otherwise make their
disapproval known at the recruitment offices where the military would be interviewing students
without violating the amendment. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, FAIR III, 126 S. Ct. 1297
(2006) (No. 04-1152), 2005 WL 3387694, at *21. Clement replied that the schools could, but he
stated that there was a "line" limiting what the schools could do. Id. The instant Court apparently
did not find it necessary to explore what that "line" might be.
91. See FAIR 11I, 126 S. Ct. at 1305 (interpreting the Solomon Amendment to require the
schools to provide the military the same access provided to other employers allowed on campus);
see also 10 U.S.C.A. § 983(b)(1) (West 2007) (requiring access for the military that is "at least
equal in quality and scope to the access to campuses and to students that is providedto any other
employer" (emphasis added)).
92. See FAIR III, 126 S. Ct. at 1305; Greenhouse, supra note 82, at Al (explaining that
during oral argument Justice Kennedy indicated that Petitioners' response that the school could
organize a protest outside of the military's interview room conceded too much).
93. Notably, Paula C. Johnson, a law professor at Syracuse University and named plaintiff
in the instant case, indicated in an interview that she expected that "things will begin to happen"
on campuses as opponents of the military had time to better organize. Greenhouse, supra note 73,
at Al. Similarly, Carl C. Monk, director of FAIR, commented to a reporter following the decision
that FAIR would "continue to require its member schools to engage in 'significant' activities to
counter the impact of the Solomon Amendment." Id. Such plans to organize protests and to see just
how far law schools can go without violating the Solomon Amendment have already begun. See,
e.g., SolomonResponse.Org, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2007)
(inviting law school students and faculty to protest the military's "don't ask don't tell" policy and
calling the FAIR III decision "a call to arms to law school administrations across the country to
vocally demonstrate their opposition"); Campus Antiwar Network, National Day of CounterRecruitment, Dec. 6, 2005, http://campusantiwar.net/index.php?option=content&task=view&
id=l 24&Itemid=36 (encouraging protests outside Supreme Court during oral arguments for FAIR
III and further promoting future events in the "movement for COLLEGE NOT COMBAT,"
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The instant Court also reined in the potentially far-reaching
implications of Dale.94 The instant case defined certain characteristics of
a group member 95 that make the Dale analysis more manageable and
eliminated its unknown breadth. 96 Dale no longer looms, threatening to
allow exclusion of any person whose mere presence might impair a
group's overall message; 97 the instant case limits the application of Dale
to situations where the presence of the unwanted person is permanent.98
This limitation prevents ridiculous circumvention of antidiscrimination
laws. 99
In sum, compelled speech is unconstitutional, inherently expressive
conduct is protected, and a speaker may not be forced to alter his or her
expressed message. The common thread is that a message must actually
be expressed. " By refusing to recognize Respondents' conduct as speech
within the confines of the First Amendment, the instant Court refused to
stretch the First Amendment to new limits.'0 ' Excluding recruiters does not
equal speaking.102 Similarly, including recruiters sends no message
regarding a school's agreement or disagreement with a recruiter's
policies. 3 If the instant Court had ruled that the conduct of excluding
recruiters was speaking, virtually any activity could easily be misconstrued

including protests at school administration offices).
94. See FAIR II, 126 S. Ct. at 1312 (distinguishing Dale).
95. See id.
96. Id. (distinguishing the effect on the message conveyed by an organization of a
permanently present group member versus that of a visitor).
97. See Chemerinsky, supra note 68, at 79 (noting that the Court had not previously limited
freedom of association to "membership"). See also Elizabeth A. Powers, Comment, Constitutional
Law: The Freedomof Expressive Association, an Organization'sRight to Choose What Not to Say,
53 FLA. L. REV. 399, 408 (2001) (interpreting Dale broadly as allowing exclusion of anyone
disagreeing with an institution's philosophy).
98. FAIR III, 126 S. Ct. at 1312. The instant Court recognized this distinction as "critical."
Id.
99. See id. (declaring that speakers may not shield themselves from laws requiring equal
access by claiming that their messages would be impaired by mere association).
100. The instant Court found that the Solomon Amendment regulated only conduct (i.e., what
the schools must do), and not speech (i.e., what the schools must say). Id. at 1307. In analyzing the
schools' conduct, the Court found that Respondents did not succeed in sending the intended
message by excluding military recruiters from law school campuses, nor did they send an unwanted
message by allowing recruiters access to campus. Id. at 1309-11. The Court noted that no one
would know why the military was interviewing off-campus without an explanation, and therefore
the conduct could not be considered inherently expressive. Id. at 1311; see also supranotes 62, 78
and accompanying text.
101. See FAIR II1, 126 S. Ct. at 1313.
102. Respondents' conduct was not inherently expressive. See supranotes 62-64, 78, 100 and
accompanying text.
103. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. Respondents were not directly compelled to
say anything via oral or written communication. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
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to fit beneath the protection of the First Amendment.'° 4 Despite the prior
trend of expansive protection, that was a line that the Court was
understandably unwilling to cross. It is still possible to "speak" without
opening your mouth, but the message must be heard loud and clear if the
First Amendment is to apply.105

104. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing the absurdity of allowing any
conduct, even conduct that is not inherently expressive, to become speech if the actor talks about
it).
105. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (demonstrating that conduct that is not
inherently expressive cannot reasonably receive First Amendment protection).
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